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ABSTRACT
When designing secure systems, we are inundated with an 
eclectic mix of security and non-security requirements; this 
makes predicting a successful outcome from the universe of 
possible security design decisions a difficult problem. We 
propose augmenting the process of security design with the 
paradigm of Security Entrepreneurship: the application of 
innovation models and principles to organise, create, and 
manage security design elements to bring about improved 
system security. We propose three initial Security Entrepr-
eneurship techniques as examples of this paradigm, describe 
how their underlying models align with secure systems de-
sign, and help predict the social and technical impact of 
possible design decisions. We also pose a number of thought 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Designing a secure system is hard. Irrespective of the 
methodology or process one uses to understand a problem 
domain and elicit a set of requirements, sooner or later cer-
tain requirements will arise which may not have obvious 
solutions. Eliciting solutions to such problems requires a 
mixture of creativity and knowledge, and the results can be 
difficult to predict. For example, ISO 27002 provides a use-
ful catalogue for possible security controls which deal with 
different problems [4], but what appears to be a reasonable
security control in one context, may fall foul of a variety of
problems in another.
The exercise of designing a secure system shares many
of the characteristics of solving a wicked problem [48]. A
wicked problem can be characterised in security by the lack
of clarity in what it means to secure the system, the lack of
an immediate test proving that a system is secure, and the
large number of possible controls which are potential solu-
tions to a specified security problem. Creative thinking helps
identify new ideas which bridge the problem/solution chasm.
However, despite the claims of security vendors purporting
to sell “innovative security solutions”, successful innovation
does not automatically follow from a creative idea.
It might seem inventive ideas are not useful for deriving
successful, innovative security designs from requirements,
but we know this to be otherwise. After all, we need only
look around us to find examples of people who find practical
solutions to wicked problems all the time. One class of ex-
emplars are technology entrepreneurs, successful examples
of which include the founders of Microsoft and Google. In
some sense, force of character has an important role to play
in this success, but so does an ability to innovate. Successes
and failures in technology innovation have been the subject
of a growing body of research which attempts to synthesise
the reasons why some inventions succeeded in the face of
overwhelming odds, while others have failed in cases where
both good ideas and the capability to commercialise them
were present. Many of these insights have been incorporated
into models of innovation, which are now mainstays in MBA
courses at many leading business schools. Consequently, a
new generation of technology entrepreneurs now use these
models on a day-to-day basis to identify opportunities with
the potential to be “the next big thing”.
Many of the ideas used to develop technology innovations
have also been used by Social Entrepreneurs—entrepreneurs
who have used the same principles to develop innovations
that address social and environmental issues, many of which
affect the developing world. Given the “wickedness” of prob-
lems faced in these contexts, we argue that many secu-
rity design problems can also be tackled by taking an en-
trepreneurial mind-set. Such an mind-set is emancipatory;
by adopting it, we treat security as an opportunity rather
than a constraint, and the user community as a social-network,
rather than an unpredictable, extended attack surface. Like
technology and social entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial design-
ers break down barriers and leverage resources at all lev-
els to design creative and workable security solutions. We
do not purport that following this approach automatically
solves design problems, but they do provide alternative per-
spectives from which to ask informed questions and identify
design criteria that may not have been otherwise considered.
This paper presents the paradigm of Security Entrepren-
eurship: the application of innovation models and principles
to organise, create, and manage security design elements to
bring about improved system security. In section 2, we in-
troduce some tenets from the innovation literature, before
introducing three sample Security Entrepreneurship techni-
ques in section 4 and illustrating these with a working ex-
ample. Finally, in section 5, we discuss the consequences
of this paradigm, and propose research directions for the
mainstream introduction of Security Entrepreneurship for
security design.
2. INNOVATION AND SYSTEM BUILDING
2.1 Creativity and design
The idea of informing the design process with ideas from
the creativity literature is not new. In particular, the Re-
quirements Engineering community has used these ideas to
“invent” requirements, which may have otherwise remained
hidden. Karlsen et al. [38] describe how a creativity sup-
port tool [36] was used to generate ideas by seeding the tool
with key words and phrases from a security scenario; the
tool generates associations between these seeds and related
words and images. This resulting imagery stimulates discus-
sion, which can lead to inventive requirements.
Some Requirements Engineering researchers go a stage
further, arguing that the discipline itself can be a direct
driver for innovation. Robertson asserts that analysts should
invent requirements rather than expecting customers to ask
for them; by understanding customer values, abstracting
ideas from known good ideas, and thinking laterally, we can
come up with innovations as powerful as Post-It notes, eBay,
and peer-to-peer networking [49].
2.2 Entrepreneurs as system builders
Robertson also suggests that innovation can be achieved
by abstracting away the elements of a problem, and tracing
the origin of the need giving rise to the problem. Under-
standing this need is the tinder which, when the spark of
invention is added, fires up an innovation. Unfortunately,
scholarly research in innovation theory indicates that envi-
sioning an invention is not enough to precipitate an innova-
tion.
The traditional view of innovation, e.g. [28] prescribes a
linear process, where an innovation is systematically derived
from an invention via a process of applied research. This
process is akin to uncovering nature, formulating creative
abstractions based on these observations, and devising tech-
nology realising these abstractions. Seminal work by Hughes
[35], who carried out a comparative study on the electrifica-
tion of different European countries in the late 19th century,
suggests other factors play a part in innovation as well.
Hughes identified several phases associated with innova-
tive system building; only one of these is the creation of the
invention itself. The other phases are concerned with (i) em-
bedding the invention into its system, (ii) producing value
from the emergent technology, (iii) adapting the technology
based on different external forces, such as the market and
other industries, and (iv) maintaining system momentum.





























The system building process, illustrated in figure 1, is also
influenced upon by internal social and cultural forces.
This model suggests the inventor’s scope is comparatively
small in the big picture. Much of the job of system building
falls on the shoulders of entrepreneurs.
The role of the entrepreneur was first described by Richard
Cantillon in the late 17th century. Cantillon described en-
trepreneurs as catalysts to production and exchange, and
the highly visible hand – as opposed to Adam Smith’s invo-
cation of the invisible hand – that ensures that markets work
[43]. Entrepreneurs have been characterised as forces creat-
ing paradoxical “gales of creative destruction” [51]; although
their work is creative, unleashing this creativity can be both
generative and disruptive to a system. Martin & Osberg [41]
describe some of the characteristics of an entrepreneur:
• They are inspired to alter an unpleasant equilibrium.
• They need the ability to think creatively, and develop
new solutions which may break from existing thinking.
• They must be prepared to take direct action to develop
a new innovation.
• They need the ability to influence others.
Like Robertson’s notion of the inventive requirements en-
gineer, the entrepreneur will envision the possibilities needed
to realise an innovation. However, the entrepreneur will also
marshal the necessary technological, market, and organisa-
tional capabilities to make the innovation happen.
2.3 Models of Innovation
To better understand how innovations develop, and what
characteristics are necessary for innovations to survive in
constantly changing organisational and market contexts, many
different models of innovation have been developed. Each
model has attempted to reason about innovation from a di-
fferent perspective.
The work of Abernathy & Clark [7] is concerned with how
knowledge underpins innovation. Their model is founded on
the argument that technological capabilities may be retained
while market capabilities are destroyed, or vice-versa. This
model explains why, in some markets, an existing piece of
technology from an established firm with complementary as-
sets and market knowledge may continue to thrive in the face
of a technically superior product from a rival start-up. Aber-
nathy & Clark also introduce the notions of incremental and
radical innovation. Incremental innovations are those which
are non-competency destroying, whereas radical innovations
can destroy existing competencies by making them obsolete,
but, at the same time, open an innovation to new markets
and opportunities.
While the incremental–radical dichotomy is useful for rea-
soning about innovation in technological and market terms,
it fails to explain why modest incremental changes can, in
some cases, have disastrous consequences. For example, de-
spite a dominant position in the photocopier market in the
1970s, Xerox lost its market-leadership in the face of newer
rivals who introduced products which were, to them, only
incremental improvements. After analysing this and similar
cases, Henderson & Clark [32] proposed that the knowledge
needed to develop an innovation is based on components,
and the architectures these components form part of. Con-
sequently, it may be more fruitful to consider innovations in
terms of whether innovation necessitates internal changes to
components and component knowledge, or modification and
re-configuration of architectures, and the — quite often —
related tacit knowledge. From a design perspective, reason-
ing about innovations in terms of component and architec-
tural knowledge and capabilities is an attractive proposition;
such concepts tie in with definitions of components and ar-
chitectures in an engineering sense.
2.4 Social Entrepreneurship analogies
In section 1, we suggest that because Social Entrepren-
eurship can solve “wicked” problems, a case exists for an
entrepreneurial approach to security design as well. To see
why, examining the similarities between classic entrepren-
eurship and Social Entrepreneurship is useful. Martin &
Osberg [41] observed that entrepreneurs in both cases are
motivated by market opportunity rather than direct finan-
cial gain, and profit is essential for sustaining the venture.
In the case of social enterprises, these profits are usually
re-invested in the business.
By considering three analogies between Social and Secu-
rity Entrepreneurship, we can appreciate why Security En-
trepreneurship has the potential to make a positive impact
to the design of secure systems.
First, the problems addressed by both Social and Security
Entrepreneurship have a social context. In the case of Social
Entrepreneurship, innovations tackle problems in disadvan-
taged social contexts. In Security Entrepreneurship, situ-
ating innovations improves the design of a secure system,
which safeguards physical or logical assets. The ultimate
consequences of damage or loss of these assets are social,
rather than technical.
Second, the value propositions nurtured by Social Entre-
preneurs are designed to empower under-served or neglected
populations. While the populations served by Security En-
trepreneurs are not usually as impoverished as those served
by Social Entrepreneurs, the need to empower the popula-
tion is the same. Properly situating security controls allows
people within the related environment to securely use their
software, and thereby achieve their primary, and invariably
non-security, goals.
Third, the success of a social innovation can be marked
when traditional organisations attempt to enter the market
place they had hitherto ignored [57]. This is both a bless-
ing and a curse in a security context. The arrival of a new
entrant with complementary assets might lead to a recon-
figuration of people, processes, and technology; this may or
may not have a disruptive impact on the overall system. On
the other hand, the new entrant may be an attacker, and
the innovation an asset which needs safeguarding as well as
developing. Therefore, it would be useful to consider how
innovation models can help to reason about how to deal with
the attack; this issue is discussed in more detail in section
5.4.
Notwithstanding analogies with other forms of entrepren-
eurship, we need to consider how entrepreneurial techniques
can be aligned with concepts associated with security and
its design before we can ascertain the usefulness of the idea
of Security Entrepreneurship.
3. SECURITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
THE SECURITY ENTREPRENEUR
In section 1, we defined Security Entrepreneurship as the
application of innovation models and principles to organise,
create, and manage security design elements to bring about
improved system security. Based on this, the role of the
Security Entrepreneur is to:
• identify opportunities for system insecurity,
• explore solutions for dealing with this insecurity, and
• remove the insecurity by re-configuring the system us-
ing the resources available.
We do not propose a new design method, but rather a
new design paradigm where innovation models and techni-
ques are used to supplement security design methods; these
techniques identify, situate, and evolve solutions to insecu-
rity. The novelty of our paradigm is that we treat the so-
lution to information insecurity in much the same way that
we might nurture a technology or social enterprise. The set
of exploitable models is large, and precedents have already
been set for using them for purposes other than predict-
ing technology innovation. The Bass diffusion model [14]
has been used to help predict the obsolescence of technology
[30], and Disruptive Innovation Theory [19] has been gen-
eralised and re-purposed to better understand innovation in
military doctrine [42]. Moreover, not only is the set of mod-
els large, it is also growing. In particular, the Social Entre-
preneurship community has identified new innovation mod-
els based on successful social innovation in the developing
world. For example, Leadbeater’s theory of Structured Self-
Organisation [40] is inspired by successful city-wide social-
entrepreneurship initiatives in Curitiba, Brazil. Waste recy-
cling and city planning may sound a world away from the in-
formation security problems we face, yet the success of these
initiatives relied on values such as collaborative engagement
and a pragmatic (rather than perfectionist) working philos-
ophy; we do not believe these values are incompatible with
the design of secure systems.
Our model of a system is based on figure 1. We assume
that the system is the amalgam of a socio-technical system,
which represents a system of technology used within a sys-
tem of activity, and the social system which surrounds it;
this system needs to be safeguarded, as well as designed.
The primary and supporting actors remain the same, but
the role of the inventor is represented by a stakeholder who
owns the security requirements during the design process.
The innovations an entrepreneur wishes to situate may be
novel design elements, or known security controls.
At first blush, analogies can be drawn between the Se-
curity Entrepreneur’s role and that of an architect or de-
sign authority for a system. Indeed, if we map insecurity
to risks, and opportunities to security requirements, the re-
sulting approach might look like one of the many existing
approaches to risk analysis [23, 20] or threat modelling [50,
54]. To understand the novelty of the Security Entrepreneur-
ship paradigm, we need to differentiate it from the existing
paradigms for designing secure systems. The easiest way to
do this is to compare and contrast the role of a software
architect with that of an entrepreneur.
Like entrepreneurs, architects make design decisions based
on the downstream effect they will have on the systems they
build [15]. An empirical study on the role of system archi-
tects [31] identified a number of characteristics shared with
entrepreneurs:
• Architects leverage social networks; they position them-
selves on a project in such a way that they are ap-
proachable to developers in the event of problems, and
develop their networks by nurturing ties with other
groups inside and outside an organisation.
• Architects span boundaries within an organisation, to
garner support or obtain commitments from comple-
mentary groups.
• Managing change and negotiation are core elements of
an architect’s work.
There are, however, several differences between these two
roles.
First, the scope for an entrepreneur is wider than that
of an architect. The architect has independence within the
scope of his project. The entrepreneur has independence
within the scope of the entire system. Moreover, unlike the
architect, his remit extends to people and processes, as well
as just software and hardware.
Second, where an architect is system-centered, an entre-
preneur is opportunity-centered. Architects may work in
teams and, where there is a chief architect, he may act as
a mediator between the different sub-system architects and
project managers; the resulting architecture is a pragmatic
realisation of a system’s goals, and an appeal to conceptual
integrity. In contrast, an entrepreneur is a lone, empowered
agent-of-change. If an entrepreneur is interested in the con-
ceptual integrity of his design, it is because he wants this
to be centered around his innovation strategy, rather than a
system’s goals.
Third, an architect needs to be mindful of ensuring his
architecture is delivered in a timely manner, usually as soon
as possible. Time is often an imperative for entrepreneurs
as well, but for different reasons. Unlike software architects,
entrepreneurs may be in competition with other entrepre-
neurs. As such, they may choose to make the strategic choice
of not bringing an innovation to market when it’s ready, but
to instead allow a competitor to take an early lead. In this
case, the entrepreneur’s strategy is to let the competitor re-
solve uncertainties about technology or the market, before
leap-frogging him with an improved product or better com-
plementary assets.
Finally, the operating environment, which is analogous to
the market in section 2.2 has a different part to play for both
roles. For both roles, failing to situate a design to the envi-
ronment can lead to system failure. However, although the
environment is non-mutable to the architect, it is shapeable
to the entrepreneur. In the same way that nascent markets
form around dominant designs, the elements of an operating
environment may shape itself around a system.
4. SECURITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
TECHNIQUES
In this section, we describe how creativity and innovation
models and techniques can be used to foster Security Entre-
preneurship. We present three sample techniques, which
can be used to support secure systems design. Our ap-
proach assumes that the process of specifying requirements
and proposing design elements to implement these is inter-
twined and self-reinforcing, as suggested by Nuseibeh [45].
The techniques presented explore the impact of security re-
quirements (section 4.1), or determine what requirements
need to be put in place to re-configure the system (sections
4.2 and 4.3).
To illustrate how these techniques might work in practice,
we describe the design of security controls for an imaginary
project developing a data-grid for clinical research. The
nodes in the grid are servers located in hospitals around the
UK. The data grid stores anonymised and partially anonym-
ised clinical data, and is accessible anywhere by authorised
end-users. The grid infrastructure has been developed and
maintained by a single group of grid developers; this group is
based at a university, and consists of system administrators
and web service developers. End-users of the grid interact
with the data grid in two ways: they can use an interactive
shell to upload and download data and workflow instruc-
tions, or they can use customised applications developed and
maintained by a separate application developed, located at
a different university. Grid nodes are maintained by local
IT support teams at the different hospitals. Although this
scenario is imaginary, it is reflective of data grids used for
clinical research in the UK, e.g. [18, 25].
In our example, a system architecture for the data grid has
been provisionally set-out, and a number of security require-
ments have been elicited. These are currently being evalu-
ated to determine candidate security controls which meet
this architecture.
4.1 Security Chindōgu
Sometimes ideas which fail to realise their potential in
one context, can be successfully repurposed in another. To
appreciate an object’s repurposing potential, it is useful to
first identify its affordances: the qualities associated with
the object and the user, which suggest action possibilities
Figure 2: Baby Mop (top), and Forget-Me-Not Digi-
tal Certificate Chindōgu (bottom). Top Image taken
from [39]
for using the object [26]. By thinking of an object in terms
of affordances offered, we can reason about how people might
realistically use an object in different contexts of use.
A major challenge in security design is building usable
security controls; the consequences of not doing so have
been well-reported [9, 58]. Unfortunately, many of the af-
fordances associated with security control invite perceptual
uncertainty, not least because their physical representation
is often far removed from its specified purpose. For example,
the ASCII representation of a X.509 Digital Certificate sug-
gests different action possibilities to a Certificate Authority
than they do for a Clinical Researcher with no knowledge of
Public Key Cryptography.
Bell et al. [16] propose using the literary device of de-
familiarization to obtain different perspectives on possible
affordances; these perspectives are obtained by viewing ar-
tifacts in strange and unfamiliar ways. By viewing what
would normally be considered mundane objects through the
eyes of someone with no familiarity of an object or its con-
texts of use, we identify opportunities or challenges asso-
ciated with an object’s use that might otherwise have re-
mained hidden. To understand the possible impact of se-
curity requirements and possible design criteria for controls
which refine them, we precede the defamiliarization exercise
with a creativity technique, and follow it with an analysis of
affordances. These affordances suggest possible design crite-
ria, more refined requirements, or further opportunities for
insecurity.
The creativity technique involves using the art of Chindōgu
to prototype a possible security control which satisfies the
requirement or requirements. This entails inventing an in-
genious gadget, which may seem like an ideal solution to a
problem, but introduces so many new problems that it ef-
fectively has no utility [6]. An example of such a Chindōgu
is the Baby Mop in figure 2 (top). The Baby Mop aids busy
parents with their household chores by allowing the baby to
mop the floor while he or she crawls upon it. For an artifact
to be Chindōgu, it must meet the following criteria:
• A Chindōgu cannot be for real use.
• A Chindōgu must exist.
• Inherent in every Chindōgu is the spirit of anarchy.
• Chindōgu are tools for everyday life.
• Chindōgu are not for sale.
• Humour must not be the sole reason for creating a
Chindōgu.
• Chindōgu is not propaganda.
• Chindōgu are never taboo.
• Chindōgu cannot be patented.
• Chindōgu are without prejudice.
In the case of the baby mop, what seems like an interesting
idea inevitably raises many, irreconcilable implementation
issues; these range from child exploitation, through to health
problems if the Baby Mop is exposed to harmful liquids, such
as bleach.
Our technique involves taking an individual security re-
quirement, or a pair of related security requirements, and
Figure 3: Forget-Me-Not Digital Certificate
Chindōgu affordances
Photos Chain Frame Dongle
Memorable Extensible Wrappable Shiny Space filler PluggablePleasurable
Forget-Me-Not Digital Certificate
developing a Chindōgu implementing it. Once the Chindōgu
has been built, its affordances are examined objectively, and
possible design ideas are elicited. Chindōgu are usually
physical rather than software-based because the affordances
of a physical artifact are easier to perceive. However, pro-
totyping a software Chindōgu, and examining its interface,
architecture, and code may also suggest affordances, albeit
in a more subtle manner.
Our rationale for developing a control as a Chindōgu rather
than a more useful prototype is the challenging nature of
the Chindōgu tenets; building an artifact which looks use-
ful but is deliberately designed to be useless is unorthodox
to most engineers, and demands creative thinking. Break-
ing from conventional orthodoxy is useful for viewing the
artifact from an unfamiliar standpoint.
The sharing of digital certificates is endemic in our data
grid example, thereby making access to the data grid by
unauthorised users a real threat. In our example, the fol-
lowing security requirement has been stipulated: a digital
certificate shall only be used by the user to whom it is issued.
Satisfying the requirement may mitigate the threat, but its
wording offers little in the way of guidance for refining the
requirement.
The Forget-Me-Not Digital Certificate in figure 2 (bot-
tom) is one solution which satisfies the requirement. The
solution involves storing a digital certificate on a dongle,
and permanently attaching this to a tasteful photograph of
a loved one, or a particularly memorable picture. As users
would want to keep an icon of such beauty with them al-
ways, they would no more share something so emotionally
valuable than they would their wallet or car keys. The idea
for using the picture frame could have arisen naturally from
brain-storming, however our idea was developed with the aid
of the combinFormation creativity support tool [36]. After
seeding combinFormation with the keyword certificate, one
of the images generated was a picture of a couple huddled
over a picture frame in a country setting.
The proof-of-concept for the Chindōgu was sketched on a
white-board, but was fabricated using raw materials com-
monly found in a Computer Science department. While
scavenging for building material, pictures of loved ones were
a fairly frequent sight, as were USB sticks, which could rep-
resent USB dongles. Because the USB sticks and picture
frames we found had small loops on the back, we could build
a simple chain using paper-clips, which were also available
in abundance. A digital certificate added to the USB stick
was a public key generated by one of the authors using PGP
[56].
Although the Chindōgu meets the explicit security re-
quirement, the number of practical problems associated with
its implementation are large enough to render the device use-
less. We examined the affordances of this Chindōgu objec-
tively, without any preconceived biases, to understand what
behaviours this artifact invites. The act of fabricating the
Chindōgu aided this analysis because the affordances were
perceived directly, rather than mentally by thought exper-
iment using a whiteboard drawing. A chart of these affor-
dances is presented in figure 3. Some of the questions raised
by analysing these affordances were as follows:
• What happens if we decide to attach more dongles,
extend the chain by adding more links, or simply re-
move the dongle and replace it with another? This
suggests a possible design criteria such that any physi-
cal or logical association between the digital certificate
and another physical or software components cannot
be re-purposed.
• What happens if the imagery we have selected no longer
gives us the pleasure it once did? Reflecting on this
question implies that any security designs should be
built around values likely to be consistent across the
population of its users?
• What happens if the imagery in our Forget-Me-Not is
so effective that users are overwhelmed with a sense
of altruism, and feel the urge to share the pleasure of
this object with other users? By using an attractive
picture frame, we have imbued our Chindōgu with re-
flective design values. As a consequence, the artifact
introduces an unplanned tension between selfishness
and altruism. Although ambiguity can be a useful
resource for fostering reflective design in an artifact
[24], the lesson to draw from this observance is that
security controls meeting this particular requirement
should appeal to the visceral and behavioural design
principles [44], rather than aesthetics.
The Security Chindōgu helps fill the space between se-
curity problems and possible solutions. Using security re-
quirements as seeds, participatory design workshops for risk
analysis can be supplemented with Security Chindōgu De-
sign Sessions to find possible ideas for mitigating risks. For
the security entrepreneur, the technique also leads to fur-
ther opportunities. In particular, the technique can be used
to bridge Open Innovation – a paradigm where both ideas
and paths to market are generated from both from within
and outside an organisation – with security design. Secu-
rity requirements could potentially be anonymised, and the
building of Security Chindōgu crowd-sourced using one of
the many available Open Innovation services, e.g. [2].
4.2 Innovation Value-added Chain
Hughes [35] found that system growth relies on correct-
ing reverse salients; these are imbalances which occur when
some parts of a system develop faster than others. Correct-
ing these reverse salients may require incremental or radical
innovation on the system components concerned.



















The Innovation Value-Added Chain examines the impli-
cations of an organisation’s innovation on its suppliers, cus-
tomers, and complementary innovators [10]. Innovations
which may require only an incremental addition to one firm’s
processes and knowledge, may be disruptive and require a
rethink in many areas of another. This model is visualised
as a simple graph where the y-axis refers to the type of inno-
vation, which may be incremental or radical, and the x-axis
refers to the different stakeholder groups in the chain.
In our aligned version of this model, we make one minor
modification. The terms Incremental and Radical can be
confusing to the lay reader; the terms might suggest the in-
novation’s perception to different groups is incremental or
disruptive. Therefore, to reflect our modelling of an innova-
tion’s impact on knowledge and processes, we instead use the
terms Component and Architectural as described in section
2.3.
In our example, we consider the different stakeholder groups
in the value-chain for several security controls; these are
commonly found in data grids used for storing sensitive med-
ical data:
• XACML policies [27]: These model the resources that
users have access to.
• X.509 Digital Certificates [3]: These are issued to au-
thorised users to enable access to grid services.
• Secure Shell (ssh) [12]: An interactive command shell;
this implements a secure channel for uploading and
downloading data and workflow instructions to the
grid.
• DICOM [5]: These standards and protocols are used
for handling, storing, and transmitting medical infor-
mation.
As well as the grid and application development teams,
we also include the IT support teams at the node locations,
and the system administrators responsible for maintaining
the node servers.
This model illustrates how the successful integration of a
security control will be contingent on the ability of relevant
stakeholder groups to situate it within their own organisa-
tional contexts.
Figure 5: Existing security data social-network






As figure 4 suggests, some stakeholder groups will inte-
grate some controls faster than others. For example, appli-
cation developers may only have to adapt to DICOM APIs
to ensure any data their applications work with is anonym-
ised. The software changes necessary to achieve this may be
slight, and the developers already familiar with DICOM. On
the other hand, IT support teams at local sites may need to
develop fundamental changes to the way PC software and
hardware is resourced and maintained to ensure these stan-
dards are met.
If the success of a project hinges on the successful inte-
gration of all of its security controls, the Innovation Value-
added chain is useful for examining how alternative controls
may help or hinder overall adoption.
4.3 Social Network Analysis
Social Network Theory is grounded in the idea that sys-
tems encapsulate thick webs of social relations and interac-
tions. Recent work in this area [17] reports on the existence
of different types of dyadic links (similarities, social rela-
tions, interactions, and flows) and, given the same nodes,
social structures can behave very differently based on their
patterns of relationship.
Existing work has examined how network topologies have
interesting properties; these can be used to reason about
attacker behaviour [11]. Of particular interest to Security
Entrepreneurs, who are interested in optimising social net-
works to create the greatest positive impact for a security
design decision, is the Strength of Weak Ties theory [29].
The theory suggests that novel information is more likely to
flow between weak, as opposed to strong, ties; this is because
weak ties can be easily disconnected from social networks.
Nodes with weak ties can be reconfigured in different ways,
based on the Security Entrepreneur’s innovation strategy.
Using our example, we examine the social network asso-
ciated with the data-grid and consider ways of obtaining
the most usable impact for our XACML and X.509 controls.
In figure 5 (left) we modelled a network structure based on
the security information flow between different actors in the
data-grid, where the arrow head represents the direction of
information flow. This structure was derived by analysing
interview transcripts from a qualitative study study on data-
grid security [22], and culling graph data based on known as-
sociations between different interviewees. The interviewees
were either end-users (blue nodes), application developers
(grey node labelled as A), or grid developers (grey node la-
belled as G). These associations were modelled declaratively,
and visually rendered using GraphViz [1].
To optimise this social network, we review the require-
ments related to the use of XACML and X.509 controls,
which must be satisfied:
• Access control decisions shall be implemented by the
grid infrastructure team, based on requests by desig-
nated users, who represent line managers for different
research groups.
• Designated users shall be the same users who authorise
requests for X.509 digital certificates.
• X.509 digital certificates shall be sent to individual
users once they have been created.
Although the collaborative ties between users is reason-
ably strong, the requirements suggest the levels of acquain-
tance between users and grid & application developers are
comparatively weak. There are also degrees of centrality
associated with the application and grid developer nodes;
these have the potential to slow down, or even distort in-
formation. Moreover, according to the requirements, the
application developer node may, in reality, only need to be
loosely connected. This gives the Security Entrepreneur an
opportunity to reconfigure the social network, and situate
security tasks to make optimal use of this characteristic.
Figure 5 (right) represents one reconfiguration of the social-
network; this fulfils the security requirements while simul-
taneously reducing the number of requisite ties. From a
usability point of view, it is desirable to remove redundant
associations, as this frees user nodes to form more relevant
[non-security] ties. There are, of course, several possible
configurations based on the social network the entrepreneur
wishes to build. In this particular configuration, we want to
be parsimonious with information flows.
5. TOWARDS SECURITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The techniques we propose have a number of benefits.
First, because they are conceptually simple and impact di-
fferent groups, they make good boundary objects; these are
artefacts flexible enough to be used within a conceptual
boundary, but robust enough to retain a common identity
across boundaries [52].
Second, these underlying models and techniques have been
empirically validated. Chindogōu’s anarchistic nature of
cherishing failure is embodied by a number of product design
consultancies, such as IDEO, who consider failure as enlight-
ened trial-and-error. For this reason, IDEO offices maintain
collections of failed product designs; these are used to iden-
tify whether a product which failed in one environment may
be successful in another [55]. Although the models of inno-
vation presented were conceived to reason about past inno-
vations, they have now developed into conceptual tools used
by many practising Technology and Social Entrepreneurs;
as section 2.4 suggests, these problems are not dissimilar to
those faced by Security Entrepreneurs.
These techniques do, however, raise a number of ques-
tions about how Security Entrepreneurship can be applied
in practice. Security Entrepreneurship espouses a world-
view where system building is an opportunity to catalyse an
innovation, where the innovation is one or more design ele-
ments. But this worldview is just one of several perspectives
which may be taken when designing a system. For Security
Entrepreneurship to be convincing, it needs to be seen by
the community as complementary and free-spirited, rather
than simply disruptive and anarchistic. Therefore, we need
to consider what some of this paradigm’s unintentional con-
sequences might be, and ask how security entrepreneurship
can be both applied in conventional secure systems design,
and progressed as a security research topic.
5.1 Security Entrepreneurship considered
harmful?
Gibson states that affordances of the environment are
what they offer the environment for good or for ill [26].
Given the opportunities afforded by Security Entrepreneur-
ship, are Security Entrepreneurs a positive influence in all
possible contexts? This paper has described how innovation
theories can be used to better inform the design of security.
However, whether the ends of such entrepreneurship results
in better security is open to debate. An unscrupulous con-
sultant may use innovation models and techniques, which
use fear to scare stakeholders into making sub-optimal secu-
rity design decisions that benefit him financially. Similarly,
an attacker may use the same techniques to organise differ-
ent design elements to bring about decreased security for a
targeted system.
Schumpeter’s proposition that entrepreneurs act as agents
of disruptive change suggests that while innovation adds
value, this value comes at a cost. This has been described
as the innovation design dilemma; structured processes gen-
erate few ideas, while more unstructured processes generate
more diversity, but at the cost of conflict that might hamper
the implementation of innovation [34]. Therefore, we need
to understand the developmental contexts where Security
Entrepreneurship may and may not be useful.
5.2 How should Security Entrepreneurship be
situated with other design activities
We also need to understand how the Security Entrepre-
neur can work with, rather than be in conflict with, other
design stakeholders like architects. An unintended conse-
quence of innovation disruption is human and technical el-
ements of a system may try to fight the disruption in some
way, rather than allowing the innovation’s environment to
stabilise around a dominant design. To do this, we need
to consider how Security Entrepreneurship and conventional
secure software engineering approaches complement each other.
Considering this raises a number of questions, which include:
• How does design data flow to and from Security Entre-
preneurship techniques? The data which contributes
to the techniques presented are by-products of security
design; security requirements are the seed for Chindōgu,
and the understanding gleaned developing them in-
forms the thinking underpinning the other techniques.
If we successfully elicit requirements from a Security
Chindōgu, how do we preserve traceability links from
the initial requirements to the subsequent requirements
derived from it, via the Chindōgu?
• How do we manage the design data generated by Secu-
rity Entrepreneurship techniques, and how do we en-
sure they are not marginalised or abused? The Secu-
rity Entrepreneur may need to revisit a current strat-
egy if the data forming the basis of an Innovation
Value-added Chain becomes stale, or a social network
evolves. Therefore, these models need to be managed
in the same way as design documents or risk man-
agement artifacts. When building Security Chindōgu,
we also need to be mindful that these are throw-away,
rather than evolutionary, prototypes. Consequently,
a change in mind-set may be required to encourage
people to retain and re-purpose Chindōgu in differ-
ent contexts, without explicitly developing these into
products in their own right.
• Who is the Security Entrepreneur? Security Entre-
preneurs are central nodes in the social network of
actors contributing to the implementation of the se-
cure system. However, as the data grid example sug-
gests, the multi-organisational nature of some systems
means it might not be obvious who should best ful-
fil this role. In the classic Information System liter-
ature, this role might have been the preserve of the
business analyst but, given the cross-cutting nature
of security, perhaps this role may, in future, be bet-
ter fulfilled by information security officers? Irrespec-
tive of who, the responsibilities of a system builder
have remained largely unchanged since first identified
by Hughes [35]. Consequently, training in the trans-
ferrable skills necessary for system builders should be
considered a pre-requisite for the successful adoption
of Security Entrepreneurship.
5.3 How is Security Entrepreurship validated?
The practical, hands-on nature of security entrepreneur-
ship means we cannot realistically evaluate it without apply-
ing it in the real world; this involves some form of interven-
tionist research methodology, such as Action Research. Ac-
tion Research aims to contribute to both the practical con-
cerns of people in an immediate problematic situation, and
to the goals of social science by joint collaboration within a
mutually acceptable ethical framework [46]. In other words,
the output of an intervention contributes both to practice
and research at the same time. An action research interven-
tion involves identifying a research question, developing an
action plan, implementing the plan, gathering and analysing
data, and reflecting on the findings of the investigation [13].
Action Research is a popular research method for eval-
uating case studies in entrepreneurship; it has even been
argued that techniques used as part of an intervention can
strengthen an entrepreneurial process [47]. The Empiri-
cal Software Engineering community is also taking a grow-
ing interest in adopting interventionist methods to evalu-
ate tools and processes, yet despite pre-existing precedents
[37, 53], we continue to rely heavily on student projects
and well-publicised exemplars to validate security design ap-
proaches. To validate approaches to Security Entrepreneur-
ship, we need to re-engage with our industry partners; in-
dustry has real security problems which need solving, and
rich socio-technical systems within which we can exercise
our approaches.
5.4 Can Security Economics help?
The models presented here are static models of innovation;
these are only concerned with the capabilities of different
groups, and the knowledge underpinning them. Several in-
novation models are more dynamic, and consider the radical
and incremental phases of an innovation following its initial
adoption. For example, the Utterback-Abernathy model [8]
is concerned with how an innovation evolves from a fluid
phase of technical and market uncertainty, through to the
transition stage where the innovation becomes a dominant
design, and then onto the specific phase when the product
focus moves from design competition through to product
performance and cost.
If we are to transpose dynamic models of information to
reason about the long-term evolution of a security control,
we need to consider what data contributes to these models.
Such models might be useful if we wish to explore adversarial
relationships associated with introducing attackers as new
entrants, which may wish to shape the market to exploit
certain assets.
Identifying this data, and exploring how these dynamic
models might transpose to security may be a fruitful area of
research for the Security Economics community. Any future
research agenda does, however, need to be conscious of the
paradoxical relationship between economics and entrepren-
eurship. This paradox arises because, although the market-
and price-based economics community has historically been
indifferent towards the interpretive and comparatively an-
archistic nature of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs are an
essential element of market economies.
Examining what these two communities currently have
in common might be a step towards collaboration between
Security Economics and Security Entrepreneurship research.
For example, an alternative perspective on Herley’s findings
on users’ rationale rejection of security advice [33] might be
obtained by analysing how much these controls contribute
to destroying the competency knowledge of different actors
associated with these controls.
6. CONCLUSION
Creativity on its own is not enough to implement innova-
tive security controls. We also need to predict the impact a
control might have from different perspectives of a problem.
Our proposal for Security Entrepreneurship makes three
contributions towards a more innovative approach to secure
systems design. First, we have described how theories from
the Technology and Social Entrepreneurship literature can
be re-purposed to develop security innovations with only a
modicum of changes. Second, we have demonstrated how
three practical techniques provide hitherto unseen insights
on a working secure system design. Finally, we have anal-
ysed some of the consequences of adopting these and other
models of innovation, and propose research questions to ad-
dress them.
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[21] Faily, S., and Fléchais, I. A Meta-Model for Usable
Secure Requirements Engineering. In Software
Engineering for Secure Systems, 2010. SESS ’10.
ICSE Workshop on (May 2010), IEEE Computer
Society Press, pp. 126–135.
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